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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Emergent qualities of a system of actors (agents) are those resultants from the interactions 
of those agents.1 These group interactions can appear to an outside observer to mimic the 
intelligence of a single entity. 
 
In social sciences some prominent theorists have discussed emergence - perhaps without 
even realising it. In all events, many social phenomena can be modeled using emergence. 
This paper discusses emergence as a tool of political analysis, examines existing political 
simulations, and proposes a simple simulation using an agent model to determine emergent 
characteristics of a political system. 
 
The paper is divided into three sections: First, a description of emergence in social science. 
Second, a description of relevant computer science concepts, including existing 
implementations. And finally, a brief description of the author's implementation. 
 
I. SOCIAL SCIENCE 
A. Emergence in Social Sciences 
 
 
Adam Smith described the free market as an emergent phenomenon: each individual trader 
seeking to maximizes his own well being acts like an agent with a utility function. The 
economic agent, acting rationally to maximize their utility function, negotiates transactions 
with other agents who also have utility functions. The agents exchange reward and 
punishment messages through transactions, and seek in each transaction to maximize self 
                                                 
1
 For a definition of emergence see: Wikipedia "Emergence" (2004) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence 
2 
interest, represented through personal wealth. Smith observed that out of these self-
interested transactions emerged, according to Smith, the optimal distribution of wealth.2  
 
Smith also noted the specialization of his economic agents3: each agent has a specific 
economic function. Specialization allows each agent to concentrate its limited resources on 
solving one part of a larger problem, relying on the other agents to solve remaining parts of 
the problem. Specialized functions of individual agents explain why a series of individual 
transactions results in greater social wealth than the isolated acts of individuals. An agent 
focused on one activity becomes much better at it then another agent who focuses on many 
activities.  
 
Ricardo takes the analysis of Smith even further, pointing out that increased productivity 
through specialisation arises not only through individual transactions but also as a result of 
whole nations trading peacefully with each other.4 Ricardo demonstrates that even where 
one agent is absolutely inferior to another it is still to the profit of both agents to trade 
because relatively the absolutely inferior agent will be less inferior in some specialized 
economic function. 
 
Emergence also can be seen in political science. According to Hobbes, the state arises 
through consent of persons living in a stateless condition and subject only to the law of the 
jungle, the law of the strongest. Hobbe's individual political agent surrenders individual 
power via a voluntary transaction with other individuals who also renounce their individual 
power to form the state. Hobbes' state is composed voluntarily by the transactions of 
persons living in it. Out of these individual transactions of real persons an artificial person 
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 See, Adam Smith, On the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html 
3
 Id. Book I, Chapter I note 39. 
4
 David Ricardo, On The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Ch. 7 (1817) 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/ricardo/tax/ch07.htm 
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with an artificial soul known as 'sovereignty' comes into being.5 Hobbes is also describing 
emergence: in Hobbes' state each individual is an agent, entering into transactions to 
contract with other individuals to form the state. 
 
A third example of emergence in social theory is the idea of 'the balance of power'.6 
According to the balance of power theory, states seek to form coalitions with other states to 
form a system to prevent the emergence of any one state as dominant hegemon. This is 
exactly a problem of agent theory in artificial intelligence: when and how do competing 
agents enter into coalitions to achieve their individual goals? According to the proponents 
of the balance of power theory, the constant shifting alliances of states prevent the 
emergence of a dominant tyrannical power and maintain peace thereby. This description is 
another example of an emergent phenomenon. 
 
But if social science does describe emergence, the emergence described in theory is 
sometimes not proven in practice. The balance of power theory is a good example of this. 
The theory was well worked out7 and seemed plausible, but ultimately did not correspond to 
reality. Rather than preserve peace through uncertainty and prevent the emergence of one 
dominant power the shifting alliances of the international system resulted in two world 
wars. Further, the result was the ultimate domination of the world not by a shifting coalition 
of states but rather by two, then one hegemonic powers. These facts invalidate the balance 
of power theory.  
 
                                                 
5
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14 (1660) 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-c.html#CHAPTERXIV 
6
 Hume, David  Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary Part II, Essay VII, "Of the Balance of Power" 
(1742) 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL30.html#Part%20II,%20Essay%20VII,%20OF
%20THE%20BALANCE%20OF%20POWER 
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 See, Wikipedia "Balance of Power" (2004) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power 
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The social contract theory can also be criticized as not corresponding to reality. No social 
contract or state of nature ever existed because in fact the state emerges from tribes, which 
emerged from extended families, which emerged from families. However, this Aristotelian 
conception of the rise of the state is still an example of emergence since the different groups 
involved have collective interests which they seek to advance and defend by entering into 
negotiations and transactions with other groups. 
 
The best prominent example of emergence in social sciences appears to be the economics of 
Adam Smith. Economics can be clearly analyzed, as Smith does, as an emergent 
phenomenon. In contrast,  emergence theory in  international relations has not recovered 
from the failure of balance of power theory to describe and predict reality. This leads to the 
interesting observation that  emergence theory in the human sciences has been most 
accurate in the positive sum game of economic relations and least successful in the zero 
sum game of deterrence and the negative sum "game" of war. 
 
This paper intends to develop a simple model of international relations as an emergent 
phenomenon. First, we must see that the military aspects of international relations are, aside 
from humanitarian relief zero sum or even negative sum, while the economic aspects of 
international relations are positive sum. At the same time we must recognize that states 
wish to maximize both their power (military strength) and their wealth (economic well 
being). We must also recognize that some acts which maximize power minimize economic 
well being and vice verse. Further, we must describe and develop competing strategies. 
Clearly some states are mercantile states: historically and even to a lesser extent today 
Singapore, Bremen, Hamburg, the Netherlands and Venice clearly centered their foreign 
policy on trade. Other states have centered their strategy on military security: Sparta, Israel, 
Prussia and the U.S.S.R.  are examples of national security states. Other states such as the 
5 
United States  Britain, have relied on flexible policies of commerce and conquest to 
advance their interests.  
 
Are the emergent qualities of the international system healthy or dysfunctional? Yes: 
Emergence in the economy is clearly healthy, but emergent qualities of the international 
system in power dynamics such as arms races and war are clearly dysfunctional. 
 
B. The contemporary international system 
 
The contemporary international system is hegemonic: one power, the United States, 
dominates the globe, at least at present, both economically and militarily. At the same time 
however, the concept of sovereignty is breaking down. Sovereignty is simultaneously a) 
devolving through privatization, regionialism, and the rising importance of individual actors 
whether corporations or individuals and b) sublimating into transnational political entities 
such as the World Trade Organization, the European Union, MERCOSUR, the United 
Nations, and NATO - among others. Sovereignty has weakened due to globalisation.8 Thus, 
the international system is increasingly complex.9  This system appears to display emergent 
properties of dynamic stability: dynamic, in that economic restructuring happens 
consstantly. And stable, for precisely that reason. Economic dynamism obviates predatory 
wars. This complex system has been analysed using tools familiar to computer science: 
game theory, agency and emergence.  
II. COMPUTER SCIENCE 
A. AI in Game Theory 
1. Game Theory 
                                                 
8
 Andrew Grosso, The Demise of Sovereignty, 44/3 Communications of the ACM (2001) p. 102. 
9
 "The main trend in the postwar international system is proliferating complexity in all dimensions of 
analysis and a parallel information explosion." John Mallery, "Thinking about Foreign Policy: Finding an 
Appropriate Role for Artificially Intelligent Computers", 1998 Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association (1988) 
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Games may be classified as zero sum (where a win for one player translates into a loss for 
other players) positive sum (where a gain for one player is a gain for other players) or 
negative sum (where each player is in absolute terms worse after the conclusion of the 
game). The central point of games is strategy: each player must choose a strategy from a set 
of possible strategies. Each chosen strategy will have some payoff. The central question of 
game theory is what constitutes rational behavior? Rationality is usually defined as that 
strategy which a player will adopt and benefit most from regardless of the strategies chosen 
by other players.10 
 
2. Coalitions 
 
Multiplayer games, such as international politics, create the opportunity for competing 
players to form temporary coalitions to secure advantages that they could not achieve alone. 
"A coalition is a set of self-interested agents that agree to cooperate to execute a task or 
achieve a goal"11  An important question of coalition theory is the ability of the coalition to 
perform a task. If the coalition can perform the task better than all the individual agents 
alone then the agents have every reason to form a coalition. "A coalition's ability to perform  
a task can be determined by the abilities of its member agents to perform their respective 
subtasks"12 
 
3. Coalitional Game Theory 
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 "In a game each of n players can choose among a set of strategies Si, i=1 ... n, and there are functions 
Ui, i=1...n:S1 x....x Sn -->R which assign to each such combined choice a payoff for each player. The 
fundamental question of Game Theory is, what constitutes rational behavior in such a situation? The 
predominanct concept of rationality here (but by no means the only one) ius the Nash equilibrium: A 
combination of strategies X1 E S1,...Xn E Sn for which U1(X1...Xi...Xn) >= Ui(X1...X'i...Xn) for all i and 
P749 X' E Si: a behavior, that is from which no player has an incentive to deviate."  
 Christos Papadimitriou, Algorithms, Games and the Internet, STOC'01 (2001), p. 749-750  2001 
ACM 1-58113-349-9/01/0007. 
11
 Ted Scully, Micheal Maden, Gerard Lyons "Coalition Calculation in a Dynamic Agent Environment" 
Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Machine Learning, Banff, Canada (2004). 
12
 Id. 
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The problem of game theory is determining what constitutes a rational strategy (e.g. 
MiniMax). The problem of coalitional game theory is to determine: First, whether to form a 
coalition (the payoff of all coalition members is better than that payoff any coalition 
member would have had on its own). Once it is known that the payoff of the coalition 
would be superior an important related question is what payoff the members of the coalition 
is optimum. These propositions can be mathematically represented as follows: 
 
"Coalitional game theory considers a game of n players as a set of possible 
2n-1 coalitions, each of which, call it S, can achieve a particular value v(S) 
(the best possible sum of payoffs among players in S, against worst case 
behavior of players in [n]-S). The problem is how to divide the total payoff 
v([n]) among the n players. Many such notions of 'fairness' have been 
proposed, defended and criticized over the past decades. ...x, considered as a 
proposed splitting of the total payoff v([n]) among the n players is fair 
according to the core school if no coalition has an incentive to secede 
(because no coalition can make more by itself than it is allocated in x)."13 
 
4. Opponent Modeling 
 
While game theory can develop an ideal strategy against all opponents, opponent modeling 
seeks to develop the ideal strategy against this particular opponent. Opponent modelling is 
important in games where information is imperfect. Further, while an algorithm such as 
MiniMax will always perform optimally in a game with perfect information a faster strategy 
requiring fewer iterations may result in a greater payoff for the game. That is, if a game 
permits not only "win" or "loss" but also "score" opponent modeling might allow a faster 
win and/or earn a higher score than MiniMax alone. 
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 Christos Papadimitriou, Algorithms, Games and the Internet, STOC'01 (2001) p. 750. 2001 ACM 1-
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Opponent modeling is also important because it reveals our unstated assumptions regarding 
our opponents. An analysis of literature in game theory and strategies reveals a very 
disturbing fact: researchers tend to make the erroneous assumption that opponents will tend 
to act alike.14 It is natural to assume that others will act as we do. In a symmetrical conflict 
this is also correct. But in asymmetrical conflicts presuming our opponent will act as we do 
is an error. Different players have differing goals and means of achieving them.  
 
A similar error to presuming our opponent sees the world we do is failing to plan for 
conflict termination. The current war in Iraq is a perfect example of that recurring problem, 
however earlier wars such as the Suez War of 1956 or the Korean war and even the 
Japanese strategy in the Second World War also show the problem of failing to plan for war 
termination. People tend to assume the best and to assume that which confirms their beliefs: 
consequently, they fail to plan for events which do not cohere with their pre-existing 
notions. A related problem is modelling defeat. If states fail to plan for the end of the wars 
they start it may be because their models of defeat are inadequate.  
 
Defeat is defined as that point where a combatant lacks sufficient emotional or physical 
resources to continue fighting. Modeling defeat  reveals tactical asymmetries: sometimes a 
limited application of force can result in wide ranging effects.15 This is because defeat by 
                                                 
14
 "On the understanding of Kennedy's problem representation they had coded into JFK/CUBA, the 
model rejected as implausible Dean Rusk's view that the soviets would likely retaliate with military action 
against West Berlin for any American airstrikes in Cuba. Because Rusk viewed the American dilemma 
regarding Cuba as essentially symmetrical to the Societ quandary regarding West Berlin, he could reasonably 
infer Soviet retaliation on West Berlin. Since the productions used to represent Kennedy's problem 
representation included no such symmetry, it ruled out Rusk's scenario." In fact the USSR and US were 
asymmetric opponents. The US was a status quo mixed power, relying as much on mercantile as on military 
strength. The USSR was a non-status quo military power. Further, they were in fact very unequal powers in 
terms of their disposable wealth and military capacity (the US had an absolute advantage as to the former and 
a relative advantage as to the later after 1949) and also in their ability to appeal to third parties (where the 
USSR had a potential advantage). Each had very different models about conflict. It is foolish to assume they 
would act symmetrically. Gavin Duffy, Seth Tucker, Investigation of the Potential Contribution of AI Methods 
to the Avoidance of Crises and Wars, Social Science Computing Review (Spring, 1995) 
15
 Gary King, Brent Heeringa, David Westbrook, Joe Catalano, Paul Cohen, "Models of Defeat", 
Proceedings of the 2002 Winter Simulation Conference (2002) p. 928. 
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attrition, i.e. exhaustion, is not in fact the only model of defeat: sometimes combatants 
suddenly break down due to lack of support, communications, or bad leadership.16 A 
consequent hypothesis is that states which fail to plan for war termination either expect to 
inflict a sudden non-attritional defeat or believe that only defeat by attrition is possible. In 
all events, there is a lack of models of psychological and political effects on conflict.17  
Material factors such as fatigue are more readily analysed but not necessarily more 
important. Fatigue occurs not just when a combatant is damaged but more importantly 
when it is damaged more severely than its opponent.18 Failure to plan for war termination 
and the consequence of nearly equal levels of losses in attritional warfare partly explain 
why the first world war lasted so long. 
 
B. Existing Research 
 
Existing research in artificial intelligence to represent political interactions seems more 
broad ranging than deep. That is, many different approaches have been tried but none 
appear to have been explored deeply. This is partly because the field of political interaction 
is itself very broad reaching: politics is universal and occurs at all times and places in the 
world's history. Topics consider range from the very abstract Ideology Machine19 and policy 
arguing programs20 to quite concrete scenarios of specific historical events.21 More recently, 
data mining of political events has also captured the attention of researchers:22 The Austrian 
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 Id. at 929. 
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 Id. 
18
 Id. at 931. 
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 Gavin Duffy, Seth Tucker, Investigation of the Potential Contribution of AI Methods to the 
Avoidance of Crises and Wars, Social Science Computing Review (Spring, 1995) 
20
 The Policy Arguer, Gavin Duffy, Seth Tucker, Investigation of the Potential Contribution of AI 
Methods to the Avoidance of Crises and Wars, Social Science Computing Review (Spring, 1995) 
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  E.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gavin Duffy, Seth Tucker, Investigation of the Potential Contribution 
of AI Methods to the Avoidance of Crises and Wars, Social Science Computing Review (Spring, 1995). 
22
 . 
 Klaus Kovar, Johannes Fürnkranz, Johann Petrak, Bernhard Pfahringer, Robert Trappl, Gerhard 
Widmer 
 Searching for Patters in Political Event Sequences: Experiments with the KEDS Database 
 Cybernetics and Systems 31(6) 2000. 
10 
Research Institute for Artificial Intelligence (ARIAI)23 is doing active research on the 
question of political AI, largely involving data mining. Only some of their research work is 
available on-line and the topic, data-mining, is outside the scope of this paper, thus the 
ARIAI is only mentioned as a possible point for scientific contact. 
 
Existing research may be broad yet shallow because few social scientists are computer 
programmers. Thus, the existing base of programmers may have limited political 
expertise.24 Finally, the problems of peace, while vital, are also not necessarily well funded 
since the results are less certain. Getting a government to fund a research project on robot 
tanks is much easier than funding a project with less concrete exciting and immediate 
results. Governments are more interested in funding war fighting than war prevention. 
 
We can analyse existing research by considering the scenarios it addresses, the technologies 
it deploys, and existing implementations. This typology is suggested because existing 
surveys are inexhaustive25 and have not yet developed a solid taxonomy.26 
 
1. Scenarios 
 
A wide variety of scenarios have been considered by political AI. Representative examples 
include the Cuban Missile Crisis27 and the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.28 
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 http://www.ai.univie.ac.at/oefai/aisoc/peace.html 
24
 Mallery (1988). 
25
 "We do not claim to present an exhaustive survey." Gavin Duffy, Seth Tucker, Investigation of the 
Potential Contribution of AI Methods to the Avoidance of Crises and Wars, Social Science Computing 
Review (Spring, 1995) 
26
 "In reviewing the main AI applications in political science, we confess our inability to categorize 
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Investigation of the Potential Contribution of AI Methods to the Avoidance of Crises and Wars, Social 
Science Computing Review (Spring, 1995) 
27
 Gavin Duffy, Seth Tucker, Investigation of the Potential Contribution of AI Methods to the 
Avoidance of Crises and Wars, Social Science Computing Review (Spring, 1995). 
28
 Id.  
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These scenarios serve to inform policy makers after the fact of their mistakes and as aides to 
human decision making may serve a useful role. There is really no limit to the scenarios 
that could be usefully modelled. 
 
2. Technologies 
 
The technologies used for implementation have generally focussed primarily on rule based 
expert systems. Secondarily, logic programming is also used, most often with PROLOG.29 
My research has not revealed scientific studies of multi-agent approaches, though CONSIM 
seems to be an agent based approach using a system of production. RISK and 
DIPLOMACY are however clear examples of multi-agent political games. Unfortunately, I 
have not found any scientific studies of these games.  
 
3. Implementations 
RISK 
 
Risk is a multi-player (2-6) zero sum game with perfect information but stochastic 
determination of combat results. When several players are involved they will form 
coalitions to prevent the dominance of any one player. When a dominant player emerges 
several or even all other players will unite against that player weakening the dominant 
player to the point that some other dominant player emerges. The remaining players will 
then unite against the new dominant player.  However since Risk is a zero sum game 
weaker players are ultimately eliminated leaving fewer and fewer players to form a coalition 
against the dominant player. This is because players in a coalition can defect from the 
coalition or even betray members of the coalition. This interplay of alliance, defection, and 
outright treachery does seem to roughly reflect international political (as opposed to 
                                                 
29
 Id. 
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economic) relations: the Napoleonic wars which Risk approximately models, featured a 
series of shifting coalitions ultimately resulting in the emergence of one dominant hegemon.  
 
Risk has been fairly succesfully represented using AI. The human player can outwit the AI 
but the AI is challenging enough to be interesting and the human player sometimes loses 
because there is a fair amount of luck involved in Risk. 
 
DIPLOMACY 
 
Another game which represents international affairs using multiple agents is Diplomacy. 
Unlike Risk there are no random elements in diplomacy. Also unlike Risk information in 
Diplomacy is imperfect: all players moves are hidden from all other players and are 
executed simultaneously. Since each player must rely on other players to have sufficient 
power to advance their interests Diplomacy is a better game for the study of coalitions. 
Unfortunately, the AI in Diplomacy is severely limited: computer opponents are easily 
defeated by human players.30 
 
BALANCE OF POWER 
 
Another interesting game simulating international politics is Balance of Power31 In this 
game a player can implement a foreign policy to advance the interests of the U.S. or 
U.S.S.R. Implementation of an aggressive policy can result in escalation leading to nuclear 
war: the centerpiece of the game is the prevention or deescalation of nuclear conflicts. Yet 
at the same time the players must risk nuclear war to advance their interests. It is a game of 
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 Chris Harding "Diplomacy" Adrenaline Vault (Dec. 28 , 1999) 
http://www.avault.com/reviews/review_temp.asp?game=diplomacy 
31
 Chris Crawford, Balance of Power: Microprose (1989). 
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brinksmanship. The computer AI allows a multiplayer mode where minor powers may enter 
into coalitions. 
 
CONSIM 
 
Whether computers can model political decision making was at first questioned32  though 
over time that threshold question seems no longer to be asked. A computer can in all events 
model basic questions such as "what will country A do in reaction to policy 1 of country 
B?"33 That is, each agent in our state system will have a policy - say wealth maximization, 
security maximization, ideological self replication, or some mix of these or other goals. 
 
Central to the analysis of political decision making are risk, cost and benefit analysis.34 
Determination of estimated states depends on placing values (utiles) on states - even 
apparently subjective emotional states or on ambiguous states such as moral or religious 
values.35 These intangibles however can be expressed because states do agree on basic 
principles such as economic prosperity, education and even reduction of violence.36  Risk, 
cost and benefit are used to determine payoff of states in the system. 
 
In CONSIM the authors constructe a matrix of probabilities. Each country has a "menu" of 
policies which it can choose from. It opponent may then, in reaction choose from its menu 
of policies.37 Policies range from peaceful to aggressive including the option of nuclear war. 
This is very similar to the later BALANCE OF POWER but with a much smaller database 
and menu of actions. CONSIM examines all available information, determines possible 
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 Joe Clema, John Kirkham, CONSIM (Conflict Simulator): Risk, Cost and Benefit in Political 
Situations, 
 p. 226. 
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 Id. at 227. 
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 Id. at 227. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at 228. 
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reactions, evaluates the merit of those reactions and then chooses the best option available 
based on its goals.38 That seems much like the behavior of an agent.  
 
The authors of CONSIM believe that future political simulations will essentially extend 
these basic characteristics.39 The authors predict descendants of CONSIM will be better 
than humans in making decisions because all available information can be evaluated.40 
However that is not the case; a computer can evaluate more information than a human but 
all information cannot be considered due to the information revolution sparked by 
computers. The authors also argue the computer will make better decisions because 
computers make no mistakes.41 Again, this very optimistic view ignores the fact that even if 
a computer has perfectly running hardware it is only as accurate as the software written for 
it. The authors also believe increased computational speed will improve computer 
performance such that it will surpass humans.42 Mallery disagrees and shows cogently that 
increased speed of computers can increase speed of errors made by computers: A small 
indetectable error in one operation iterated millions of times results in a huge error whose 
source is difficult to discover. The final reason offered for better AI performance is that 
prejudice and emotion are removed from decision making resulting in more objective 
outcomes.43 That is partly correct: Computer analysis can help us to step back from the 
problem and be more realistic about it. However prejudice still exists and is programmed 
into the computer at the point where values are chosen and weights assigned to risks, costs 
and benefits. But that is not an argument that the computer can be a superior decision maker 
than a human. Rather it is an argument that the computer can help humans to reevaluate 
human decisions. 
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Critique 
 
CONSIM can be criticized as it is an irresponsible and frightful experiment which proposes 
that computers should be used to determine whether to use nuclear weapons.44 Mallery 
rightly critiques such folly. He points out that even if the AI works, computerization leads 
to a risk of amplification of erroneous messages45 For an example of this we can look at 
markets where the second order effects of AI have clearly resulted in increased volatility.46  
Mallery concludes that AI modeling is at present only suitable for description and research 
but is not adequate for prescriptive policy making.47 I agree with this analysis: AI has an 
interesting pedagogical and even analytical role but should not replace a human decision 
maker in questions of war fighting. 
 
 
III. IMPLEMENTATION  
 
The author proposes a simple three agent system to model very basic diplomatic and 
economic strategies. It consists of three "states", one which centers its strategy on national 
security, one centering its strategy on trade, and a third which takes a mixed approach of 
trade and security. The agents can build arms, enter into simple alliances, pay tribute to 
stronger states, or attack and predate the resources of weaker states. Utility functions are 
determined by the economic well being of the state: desperate agents do desperate things.  
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 John Mallery, Thinking about Foreign Policy: Finding an Appropriate Role for Artificially Intelligent 
Computers, 1998 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (1988) 
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Internationally, states rarely disappear completely. Poland is just one example of a state 
which has often been dismembered only to be reconstructed. Thus, in the game, even if a 
state in this game loses all its resources or arms it continues to exist. Thus in a sense this is 
not a "game" since we usually think that games have an end state. Thus we would choose an 
arbitrary numebr of iterations for the "end state": Say, ten turns. 
 
This raises the question how is victory determined? We know that a state with fewer 
resources and weapons than its neighbor has lost, but what of two states, one of which is 
better armed but poorer than the other? An experimental approach would run the simulation 
one turn further. That is in fact one point the game is trying to illustrate: the indeterminate 
relations of states. In absolute terms, both the mercantile state Athens and the militarist state 
Sparta were worse after the Pelopenesian war than before. Yet in relative terms, Sparta 
emerged militarily dominant but culturally poor. Everyone lost by any measure in absolute 
terms but in relative terms of power (as opposed to wealth) Sparta won.  
 
A. Agent Strategies 
 
The strategies of the three agents are very simple: the mercantile agent seeks to maximize 
its wealth building arms only when absolutely necessary. The mercantile state can also seek 
to appease its more aggressive neighbors and always seeks to trade with them rather than 
predate their resources. It is a "sharper" trader in that it will always outperform its rivals in 
trading in relative terms. That is, trade in the game is positive sum in absolute terms, 
however it is more beneficial to the mercantile state than the other states. 
 
The militarist state in contrast seeks to achieve military dominance over its opponents. It 
can and will attempt to predate the resources of its neighbors at every opportunity using the 
17 
stolen resources to build more arms to steal more resources. The militarist state does not 
seek to enter into alliances becuase it is following a strategy of autarchy. 
 
The mixed state attempts to both trade and maintain a strong military. It can predate the 
resources of weaker states but prefers to trade because it can build more arms by trading 
resources and then converting traded resources than by simply predating. The mixed state 
does not pay tribute to the mercantile state but can pay tribute to the militarist state. 
 
B. Agent Intentions 
 
No state can observe the intentions of any other state, however the game presumes perfect 
information: each state knows the size of the armies and economy of the other states.  
 
C. Learning Functions 
 
The agents in this game can learn: namely, if a state attempts to pay tribute, but is predated 
anyway it will no longer pay tribute. A more developed game would have the states 
remember what states entered into and observed alliances, and would allow states having 
formed alliances to break them treacherously or openly. 
 
D. Results  
 
In principle, the game presents a simplified model of inter-state relations. It could be made 
more realistic through the addition of further agents (states), a closer linkage between utiles 
used in the game and actual economic and military statistics. Formation and renunciation of 
alliances could also be integrated into the game. But at least the rudiments of a model of 
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international relations are represented by this game. The game illustrates some useful and 
interesting features both of international relations and of multi-agent approaches to AI. 
 
E. Paths for future research 
 
Future AI representations of international politics should examine the multi-agent approach 
sketched here in greater detail. Existing implementations should be studied and expanded 
upon to consider the fact that international relations are at times zero sum but generally are 
in fact positive sum. It may be possible to use open source implementations of various Risk 
like games as a basis for more serious research on shifting alliances in coalition game 
theory. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Though political AI cannot be used for war fighting it can be used as an aid to human 
decision making, as an evaluative heuristic for planing and review. Moreover, political AI 
has pedagogic interest. Simulations of international relations have been proven to create 
more interest in students than conventional lecturing.48 Further, presenting international 
relations problems as simulations results in students having a greater understanding of 
problems in international relations and how decisions are made.49 Simulations may reduce 
the learning time of students in international politics.50 What lessons does political AI 
teach? 
 
                                                 
48
 David Louscher, The Effectiveness of a Short Term Simulation for Teaching Foreign Policy and 
National Security Affairs, Simulation and Games (December 1977) p. 449. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
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We have seen the errors in planning (failing to plan for war termination; presuming 
symmetry of opponents where it may not in fact exist) and the risks of AI in game playing 
(automated nuclear war). Simulation results also reveal something else which is just as 
interesting: Zero sum games representing international affairs tend "to produce universal 
empires, in which one state eventually achieves global domination."51 Unlike the 
discredited balance of power theories, which argued that shifting coalitions would prevent 
the emergence of one universal power, universal empires seem to be the fate of the world: 
Rome, but also China and the Incas and Aztecs even the Moguls show us historical 
examples of universal empire. More recently the British empire and most currently 
American hegemony show the tendancy of the world to a monopoly of power. AI reveals 
what is already implicit in a historical understanding of international relations. However it 
does not tell us explicitly why multi-polar systems tend to monopoly of power under one 
hegemon nor whether that is economically desirable. Finally, implementations are zero sum 
and thus one dimensional, focussing almost exclusively on political power (the ability to 
deploy violent force) without considering economic power.  
 
My implementation is intended to illustrate:  
1) a multi-agent approach 
2) a mixed game approach: 
a) zero sum aspects as to deterrence 
b) negative sum aspects as to war fighting 
c) positive sum aspects as to trade 
 
I hope that this account will result in a more balanced understanding of how states interact 
with each other than the bellophilic examples. In this regard, we should look carefully at 
                                                 
51
 Gavin Duffy, Seth Tucker, Investigation of the Potential Contribution of AI Methods to the 
Avoidance of Crises and Wars, Social Science Computing Review (Spring, 1995). 
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Crawford's Balance of Power - a zero sum wargame where the goal of the game is to 
prevent war.
21 
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